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An Empirical Study of Credit Default Swaps 
 
 
Many credit risk models have been proposed in recent years. However there are few 
studies that examine the empirical results from these models in pricing market traded 
credit derivatives. This paper addresses this gap by implementing binomial versions of 
Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and applying them to price 
credit default swap contracts.  
 
We make three contributions. First, are far as we are able to determine we are the first to 
empirically examine the pricing of credit default swaps, an important instrument in the 
developing over the counter credit derivatives market. Second, we examine the empirical 
performance of the “return of market value” and the “return of Treasury “ recovery 
assumptions that underlie the difference between the Duffie and Singleton (1999) and 
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) credit risk models. Finally, by appealing to basic financial 
theory, we develop a methodology to estimate a yield curve that is subject to credit risk 
by calibration. This allows us to estimate a below investment grade yield curve that is 
applicable for the pricing of a particular credit default swap, thereby resolving an 
important empirical problem.   
 
We find negative economic values from the credit protection buyer’s point of view for 
credit default swaps written on bonds subject to the recent Asian currency crisis. In 
contrast credit default swaps not subject to the Asian currency crisis generally have 
positive economic values. We speculate that these results are evidence of the moral 
hazard problem that practitioners claim exists when payments from the credit default 
swap maybe triggered by bond restructuring as well as default.
1 
 
We find that Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) returns lower premium values and default 
payment values from credit default swaps than those found by Duffie and Singleton 
(1999). This happens because Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) obtain higher hazard rates than 
Duffie and Singleton (1999) given the same information set concerning a particular credit ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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default swap. This confirms the numerical analysis of Delianedis and Lagnado (2002), 
but with market traded information. 
 
An important barrier to empirical research in credit risk is the lack of precise information 
concerning the credit risky yield curve applicable to a given credit default swap. Helwege 
and Turner (1999) find that for bonds rated below investment grade, credit ratings are not 
precise enough to discriminate among bonds of different credit quality. Yield curves 
estimated for below investment grade bonds tend to be downward sloping, not because of 
any “crisis at maturity” problem, but because longer-term bonds rated below investment 
grade are more credit worthy than shorter-term bonds of the same credit rating. They 
show that once constructed from paired short and long term bonds from the same firm, 
below investment grade yield curves tend to be upward rather than downward sloping. 
This suggests that applying say a generic BB yield curve in an attempt to value a credit 
default swap written on a BB bond may lead to important bias. 
 
We overcome this problem in the following way. In the absence of market frictions, MMI 
says that value additivity must hold so the value of the credit risky coupon bond 
underlying the credit default swap contract is simply the sum of the present value of its 
component cash flows. In other words, a coupon bond is a portfolio of zero coupon bonds 
where each zero coupon corresponds to a coupon or redemption payment and the sum of 
the values of these zeros must equal the value of the bond. In theory, the structure of 
credit risky zero coupon interest rates generated by a candidate credit risk model should 
replicate the market price of coupon bonds exactly. If not, then this implies that value 
additivity does not hold because the coupon bond, being composed of a portfolio of 
zeros, is worth less (more) than the addition of values of component zeros. This presents 
a pure arbitrage opportunity to market participants who should then buy (sell) the 
undervalued (overvalued) coupon bond and sell (buy) the portfolio of zeros by (reverse) 
coupon striping the coupon bond. Hence pure arbitrage will force value additivity to hold.  
 
This means we have a check on the reasonableness of our estimate of the corporate yield 
curve. First we calibrate a given credit risk model to an initial estimate of the credit ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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spread defined as the difference between our initial estimate of the yield curve that is 
subject to credit risk and an exogenously supplied Treasury yield curve. The structure of 
zero coupon interest rates generated by the calibrated candidate credit risk model is then 
used to price the bond. If the credit risk model overprices (underprices) the underlying 
credit risky coupon bond relative to the known market determined bond price, we add 
(subtract) a few basis points to (from) the yield curve that is subject to credit risk. We 
recalibrate the candidate credit risk model to this adjusted credit spread to obtain a new 
price for the credit risky coupon bond. We compare this price to the known market price 
of the bond and if they are not equal, we adjust the spread as outlined above once more. 
We continue to make adjustments to the credit spread until the candidate model replicates 
the value of the observed market price of the credit risky bond that underlies the credit 
default swap contract. Therefore we are able to obtain a reasonable estimate of the credit 
risky yield curve by ensuring that our estimate of the credit spread is consistent with 
value additivity. A reasonable estimate of the credit risky yield curve is important 
because the credit default swap is priced relative to this yield curve. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In the first section we will discuss the literature in 
general and Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) in particular. In 
the second section we will discuss how we implement these models by describing the 
data sources and the empirical procedures we employ. In the third section we present and 
discuss the empirical results. Finally we summarize our results and present our 
conclusions in section four. 
 
IA General Literature Review 
 
Proposed models of credit risk can be classified into two basic categories, structural 
models and reduced form models. The structural model views bonds subject to credit risk 
as options written on the value of an underlying firm’s assets, such as Merton (1974), 
Chance (1990), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996) and Saa-Requejo 
and Santa- Clara (1999). However, use of this approach requires information difficult to 
obtain since large portions of a firm’s assets do not trade
2.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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In contrast reduced form models use only market determined prices or parameters that 
can be estimated. This occurs because reduced form models assume default is a result of 
some exogenous process and so does not require estimates of the value of the firm’s 
assets. A variation of these reduced form models is implemented by calibrating at least 
one unknown parameter to assure that the model replicates an exogenously supplied 
credit spread. This is an important empirical advantage since it relieves the empiricist 
from estimating or supplying at least one parameter. This is the reason why we focus on 
this type of model in this study. 
 
The reduced form models can be further sub-divided into transition matrix and default 
models. Transition matrix models attempt to model the recovery process such that there 
are a series of stages a bond would pass through before the bond reaches the absorbing 
default state. In contrast, default is instantaneous in the default models. Examples of the 
former are Das and Tufano (1996), Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) and Schönbucher 
(1998) who concentrate on extending the reduced form approach by modeling the 
recovery rate. Das and Tufano (1996) and Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) model the 
recovery rate as a Markovian chain with as many states as credit classes while 
Schönbucher (1998) allows for multiple defaults.  
 
Default models such as Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Das and Sundaram (1998), Duffie 
and Singleton (1999) and Collin-Dufresne and Solnik (2001) develop more simple 
models where the bond either survives and pays whatever has been promised or defaults 
and pays a recovery amount. Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) assume recoveries in the event 
of default are a constant fraction of a Treasury zero. They solve for the hazard rate 
(pseudoprobability of default) by calibrating this parameter to guarantee that the model 
replicates an exogenously supplied credit spread. Das and Sundaram (1998) extract 
values of the recovery and hazard rates jointly from a bivariate model of the credit spread 
through use of a logit procedure. This procedure requires a time series of term structures 
to implement. Finally Duffie and Singleton (1999) model the credit risky interest rate as 
the default free interest rate plus a term that jointly adjusts for the hazard and recovery ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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rates. This simplification is possible because they assume that recoveries in the event of 
default are a fraction of the “survival contingent” value of a credit risky bond. This 
simplification allows one to model credit risky interest rates in the same way that we 
currently model credit risk free interest rates and reduces considerably the computational 
burden of implementing reduced form credit risk models. Collin-Dufresne and Solnik 
(2001) develop a multifactor reduced form default model that uses information in the 
swap term structure to explain the LIBOR-swap spread. 
 
Recently hybrid models have been proposed that promise to combine the conceptual 
insights offered by structural models with the tractability of reduced form models. Zhou 
(1997) places a reduced form jump diffusion process for the value of the firm and Madan 
and Unal (1998) employ a two factor reduced form process that allows the value of 
equity to fall to zero once the sum of the value of interest insensitive cash assets and 
interest sensitive assets is less than the value of interest sensitive liabilities. 
 
IB The Models 
 
Our objective is to price credit default swaps. Since credit default swaps are American 
style options, there is no known closed form solution. Consequently we chose a binomial 
lattice implementation. We chose Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Jarrow and Turnbull 
(1995) because we wish to explore the choice between the “return of market value” (RM) 
and the “return of Treasury” (RT) recovery assumptions that is respectively employed by 
these two models. We first obtain a general expression that is applicable for all 
defaultable claims and then fill in this shell with Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and then 
Duffie and Singleton (1999) to highlight the importance of the different recovery 
assumptions. 
 
Under the risk-neutral probability measure Q conditional upon information available up 
to date t, Duffie and Singleton (1999) show that the price of a one period defaultable zero 
is written as, ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 




Note that ht is the conditional (upon no prior default) hazard probability and rt is the pure 
(credit risk free) interest rate at time t. Meanwhile dt+1 is the recovery rate and Vt+1 is the 
promised payoff of $1 at maturity t+1.  In other words a defaultable zero promises to pay 
Vt+1 at maturity t+1, but the promise may be broken at hazard rate ht. If default occurs 
with hazard rate ht at time t, an amount dt+1 is paid at time t+1, conditional upon no prior 
default. Then, under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, this future expected cash 
flow is discounted by the pure rate of interest.  
 
The above is a general expression for the value of a one period defaultable zero. Nested 
within it are the Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) models. To 
highlight the differences among these models and the challenges confronted when 
modeling credit risk, we re-write (1) in state price format in the case of a two period 
defaultable zero. We assume the existence of the risk neutral probability measure.
 3  
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The above expression says that a defaultable zero may default during the first period with 
hazard rate h(t,j) and recover dt+1 at the end of the first period. The amount is reinvested 
in a Treasury security to earn the evolving stochastic Treasury interest rate until promised 
maturity. If the defaultable zero survives the first period with probability [1-h(t,j)], it may 
default at maturity in a high credit risk (high hazard rate) state with hazard rate 
h(t+1,j+1), or it may default at maturity in a low credit risk (low hazard rate) state with 
hazard rate h(t+1,j). If the zero defaults during the second period, investors recover dt+2 at 
maturity. The corporate zero pays the promised $1 (Vt+2) at maturity conditional upon 
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survival for both periods. All potential cash flows, both the terminal payoff and recovery 
amounts, are discounted back to the present using binomial stochastic pure interest rates.  
 
Note that (2) explicitly recognizes that prior to maturity recovery amounts d are 
reinvested in a Treasury security for the remaining maturity of the zero. This is necessary 
as (1) and (2) implicitly assumes that the investor is choosing (under the risk neutral 
probability measure) between a credit riskless and credit risky zero, and this reinvestment 
assumption ensures that the time horizon of the alternatives are consistent.  
 
Two challenges are evident in (2). First, what is the relationship between hazard 
probabilities h(t,j) that evolve in credit risk state j and pure rates of interest r(t, i) that 
evolve in interest rate state i? Second, hazard probabilities are conditional probabilities in 
that in order to default at t2, the bond must survive t1. This means that in all possible 
credit risky states j and interest rate states i, one must measure expected conditional 
payoffs in the event of default under the risk neutral probability measure for not only the 
current period, but also all possible prior periods. This requires a considerable computing 
effort. While both models discussed here deal with these challenges, Jarrow and Turnbull 
(1995) focus on the first challenge while Duffie and Singleton (1999) focus on the 
second. 
 
It is tempting to solve the first challenge by “brute force”, that is calculate all possible 
hazard and pure interest state prices for all time periods. However this would be 
computationally expensive. The number of pure interest rate states will equal t+1, and the 
number of hazard states will be t+1 and all possible combinations will be (t+1)
2. 
Consequently, Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and Duffie and Singleton (1999) impose 
distributional assumptions regarding the relationship between hazard and pure interest 
rates. 
 
We now obtain a general binomial version of the Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) model from 
(2). A case of this result will be Duffie and Singleton (1999). By examining how the 
binomial version of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) is transformed as we transform the ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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recovery assumption will illustrate how Duffie and Singleton (1999) have met the second 
challenge. To obtain a binomial version of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) we suggest the 





The first binomial stochastic process is Black Derman and Toy (1990), where r(t,i) refers 
to the pure interest rate that evolves in state i and time t, urt and zst are time dependent 
parameters that calibrates the interest rate tree by forward induction through use of state 
prices to the exogenously supplied Treasury zero yield and volatility curves respectively 
and DT is the time step. Note that when t = 0, then r (t,i) is defined to be today’s known 
short term pure rate of interest r(0,0).  
 
The second binomial stochastic process describes the evolution of the one period hazard 
rate and the joint probability distribution between r (t, i) and h (t, j). Through covariance 
between the pure rate of interest and the hazard rate, correlation rh, r between these 
parameters is included. This covariance is scaled by the time dependent pure interest rate 
volatility sr,t leading to a multiplicative term that models the volatility of hazard rates as 
the responsiveness of hazard rates to the current pure rate of interest.
4 Of course this 
means (4) generates a recombining hazard rate process since (3) is a recombining 
process. In (4) the time dependent parameter vt calibrates the hazard rate tree by forward 
induction through use of corporate state prices to the corporate zero yield curve and sht is 
the hazard rate volatility parameter. Note that when t = 0, then h(t,j) is defined to be 
today’s one period hazard rate (pseudoprobability of default) h(0,0).  
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Together the binomial processes (3) and (4) form a model similar to Das and Tuffano 
(1996) in that we assume a linear scaling of cash flows. By applying the law of iterated 
expectations, the two binomial trees (3) and (4) are combined to calculate defaultable 
state prices which forms a single binomial tree. Procedurally we first calibrate the pure 
interest rate process at today’s date t=0 to the Treasury zero yield and the Treasury 
volatility curves by adjusting the calibration factors urt and zst respectively for all future 
dates. This obtains the pure interest binomial tree the values of which [r (t, i)] are 
included in the hazard rate process (4)
5. We then calibrate the hazard rate process, which 
is correlated with the Treasury interest rate process generated by the first calibration, to a 
credit risky zero yield curve by adjusting the calibration factor vt. Simultaneously this 
calibration adjusts the structure of defaultable state security prices until the yield implied 
by the portfolio of all defaultable state securities that matures at a given date agrees with 
the corresponding yield from our estimate of the credit risky zero yield curve. This 
process continues for all future dates such that at each date, the yield of the replicating 
portfolio of defaultable state securities agrees with the corresponding yield from our 
estimate of the credit risky term structure. 
 
Substituting (3) and (4) into (2) and rewriting slightly to highlight the RT assumption we 
obtain a binomial version of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995)







( ) [ ] [ ] { } (5)                                                         V h(0,0) 1 x h(1,1 h(1,0) 0.5 - 1 x
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Equation (5) is a binomial version of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995). However unlike the 
original Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) this model allows for correlation so there are as 
many hazard rate states as there are pure interest rate states. Equation (5a) highlights the 
RT recovery assumption where conditional upon no prior default in any prior time and 
Treasury interest rate state; a recovery amount d is paid at the end of the current period. 
Should default occur prior to maturity, the recovery amount is reinvested in a Treasury 
security until promised maturity. These recovery amounts are then included in (5). These 
recovery amounts are then multiplied by Treasury zero prices so these recovery amounts 
are ultimately expressed as a fraction of the value of a Treasury zero. This is the RT 
assumption that underlies Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) for the recovery amount that is 
paid at the end of the first period is a fraction of a one period Treasury zero. Similarly the 
recovery amount paid at the end of the second period is expressed as a fraction of a two 
period Treasury zero. 
 
By restricting parameters to particular forms we can obtain other models.  If correlation is 








Note that the RT assumption remains intact. Equation (6) is easier to implement than (5). 
We calculate just one ht for each time period. Since ht is equally likely at each interest 
rate state r(t,i), we add the sum of expected values under ht at time t and then present 
value this sum at each possible interest rate r(t,i) at time t. We continue to do this rolling 
backwards through the corporate price tree.
7 In contrast, to implement (5) we need to 
( ) [ ] ( ) (6a)                                                                 h 1 h e e 0.5 h 0 1
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calculate two binomial trees, one for r(t,i) and another for h(t,j), and then combine them 
to form h(t,i).  We then present value each expected value under h(t,i) by the 
corresponding state contingent pure interest rate r(t,i) at date t. We continue to do this 
rolling backwards through the corporate price tree. 
 
If we adjust (5a) to conform to the return of market recovery assumption we obtain 
Duffie and Singleton (1999). Specifically, the Duffie and Singleton (1999) binomial 




This expression says that in the event of default h (t,i) losses Lt+1 are experienced at the 
end of the period. One minus this expected loss rate is then multiplied by the promised 
value Vt+1 to find the expected value. Then we find the present value of this expected 
value. In (7), Lt+1 is the end of period loss rate that is equal to the following expression 




In other words, (7a) says that upon default the investor loses an amount L. This amount is 
one minus the recovery amount. In turn this recovery amount is a fraction w of the end of 
period survival contingent value of a $1 face value zero.
 8 In contrast, the RT assumption 
in (5a) models recoveries as a fraction of a Treasury zero. The advantage of the RM 
formulation is that if recoveries are fractions of survival contingent values then values 
associated with prior period defaults are included in (7) as a multiplicative term. The 
facilitates forward induction, allowing us to apply pure interest rate modeling techniques 
directly to a corporate rate of interest without the extra computational complexity of 
adding values associated with prior period defaults to each corporate state price. In 
[ ] ( ) { } (7a)                                                      ùV h(1,1) h(1,0) 0.5 h(0,0) - 1 - 1   L
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contrast, (5a) and (6a) show that to implement the RT recovery method, one needs to 
make a separate additive calculation of expected conditional payoffs in (5) and (6) 
respectively in the event of default for all possible prior periods at each pure interest rate 
state.  
 
II Empirical Procedures 
 
The first step is to choose our sample. We collect forty-five default swap trades. For each 
trade we obtain the default swap ticket. This document contains important details of the 
premium, credit event parameters and the payout structure in the event of default of the 
bond insured by the credit default swap (hereafter, the reference security). The premium 
is specified as the total number of basis points to be paid each year. Payments are made in 
installments, typically quarterly, and are based on the specified notional principal 
amount.  Applicable credit events are specified, which include “failure to pay”, 
“bankruptcy”, “repudiation” and “restructuring”.
9  Payoffs in the event of default are 
defined as par value less the value of the defaulted security, where the value of the 
defaulted bond is established as the average of (typically) five independent dealer quotes. 
From this document we are able to identify the reference security and the precise date of 
trade.  
 
To avoid extra complications we eliminate all credit default swaps whose reference 
security is a floating rate or a foreign currency bond. Therefore our sample contains 
thirty-one straight sovereign US dollar credit default swaps for the September 1997 to 
February 1999 time period. This time period contains the worst of the recent Asian 
currency crises so credit default swap premiums reflect these events. To obtain 
information about the effect these events had on the credit default swap market, we sub-
divide our sample into two categories, “Asian swaps” which evidently experienced a 
currency crisis and “non-Asian swaps” which evidently did not experience a currency 
crisis. This geographical classification is particularly easy to perform since all swaps in 
our remaining sample are sovereign swaps. We then plot the yield of the reference bond, 
the corresponding maturity Treasury yield, the resulting credit spread and the credit swap ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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premium. In general the reference security will be different at points along the time series 
plot, but since all are long-term dollar securities the resulting plot is reasonably 
continuous. 
 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the time series plot of the non-Asian and Asian sub-samples. Figure 
1 shows that for credit default swaps not experiencing a currency crisis the swap 
premium plots within the credit spread. However Figure 2 tells another story. Beginning 
in June 1998 credit swap premiums rise dramatically, now plotting above the credit 




This data should provide a rigorous challenge for Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Jarrow 
and Turnbull (1995), as they are required to measure the market prices of credit default 
swaps subject to widely varying credit risk conditions. To implement these models we 
need estimates of the Treasury yield curve, the credit risky yield curve applicable to the 
reference bond and the correlation between the Treasury interest rates and the credit risky 
interest rates applicable to the reference bond. In addition we need Treasury interest rate 
volatility, and the volatility of credit risk. Finally we need the price of the reference bond, 
the binomial structure of hazard rates and the recovery rate of the reference bond in the 
event of default. Note that all of this information must apply on the date of the credit 
default swap trade. 
 
We estimate the zero coupon Treasury yield curve on the date of each credit default swap 
transaction by applying the Nelson and Siegle (1987) yield curve estimation procedure to 
Treasury transaction prices supplied by the National Association of Insurance 
Companies’ (NAIC) database. The NAIC database contains the details of each bond 
transaction member insurance companies report to the national body, representing 30 to 
40% of all US domestic over the counter bond trading activity. Each transaction contains 
all the important details such as the CUSIP of the bond, transaction date, clean price, ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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accrued interest and day count conventions. A separate cross sectional file contains all the 
major bond covenants of each issue. This information can be linked up with the 
transaction file, so we are able to avoid using transactions tainted by optionality. We 
estimate a ten-year Treasury yield curve as the maturity of the reference bond in all our 
default swaps is never longer than ten years. 
 
Unfortunately we find that the liquidity of the Treasury market dried up during 1999 so 
we were unable to find a sufficient number of Treasury transactions at the required breath 
of maturities to estimate a ten-year Treasury yield curve for the three dates we need in 
1999. We obtain the 1999 Treasury yield curves in the following way. First we obtain the 
par coupon Treasury yield curve on the days that the credit default swaps traded from 
datastream’s 401N program.  We then applied Nelson and Siegle (1987) to extract the 
zero coupon yield curve from this information. 
 
We also obtain the price and yield of the reference bond and the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 
year at the money implied interest rate cap volatility from Datastream’s 901b program at 
the same dates that the credit default swaps were sold. We linearly interpolate implied 
cap volatility to form an estimate of the Treasury volatility curve. We estimate the 
applicable credit risky yield curve by calibration in the following way.  
 
We first calibrate the Black Derman and Toy (1990) pure interest rate process to the 
Treasury zero coupon and cap volatility curves on the trade date of the credit default 
swap. We initially assume that the credit risky yield curve is the sovereign yield curve 
plus a credit spread calculated as the difference between the reference bond’s yield and 
the corresponding maturity US Treasury yield. Then we calibrate the candidate model to 
this credit spread using reasonable values for the recovery fraction, credit risk volatility 
and correlation between hazard rates and Treasury interest rates. Later we test our initial 
estimates of key parameters to ensure that these choices do not materially affect our 
results. 
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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We chose recovery rates that are consistent with the credit rating of the reference bond. 
This information is available from Altman, Cooke and Kishore (1999) who report the 
average trade price of defaulted bonds one month after default. These averages are 
computed over the 1971 to 1998 time period, and are reported by broad rating category. 
We find the historical credit rating of the candidate reference bond from Standard and 
Poors web site. We chose credit risk volatility as one tenth of Treasury interest rate 
volatility since we suspect that credit risk volatility is related to, but less that Treasury 
interest rate volatility. Finally we assume that the correlation between Treasury interest 
rates and hazard rates applicable to the insured bond is -0.1 since Collin-Duffresne, 
Goldstein and Martin (2001) suggest that correlations between Treasury interest rates and 
the credit spread are negative.  
 
Based on these estimates we run a given candidate model to see if these choices for the 
candidate credit risky yield curve, recovery fraction, credit risk volatility and correlation 
between Treasury and credit risky interest rates are able to replicate the known price of 
the reference bond. When running the model, the binomial structure of pure (credit risk 
free) interest rates and hazard probabilities are calibrated until they replicate the given 
Treasury and the initial estimate of the credit risky yield curve. The binomial structure of 
Treasury interest rates and hazard probabilities, along with the recovery fraction, also 
generates a binomial structure of credit risky interest rates. This binomial structure of 
credit risky interest rates is then used to price the reference bond.  
 
Usually the price of the reference bond is not replicated. We discover that changes in the 
credit risk volatility and correlation between Treasury rates and hazard rates do not 
appreciably change the price of the reference bond that we obtain by the two credit risk 
models. For example, by changing credit risk volatility by a factor of ten results in less 
than $0.01 change in the price of the reference bond. Similarly the price of the bond 
obtained by both models is insensitive to large variations in correlation between Treasury 
rates and hazard rates. These results are not surprising as the underlying bond is a cash 
instrument that should be much less sensitive to volatility and correlation than a 
derivative security. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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Furthermore we find that the price of the underlying bond is not sensitive to changes in 
the recovery rate. This is what we should expect because as the recovery rate increases 
(decreases), a renewed calibration of the candidate credit risk model will have larger 
(smaller) hazard probabilities. In other words, the calibration process takes the credit 
spread as given so for a given credit risk model an increase in the recovery rate is offset 
by an increase in the hazard rate. Therefore the renewed calibration replicates the credit 
spread with a different combination of hazard and recovery rates that results in the same 
price of the reference bond. 
 
However, the reference bond’s price obtained by the two candidate models is sensitive to 
the size of the credit spread. Therefore we generate a new credit risky yield curve by 
adjusting the credit spread until we replicate the market price of the reference bond. In 
this way we estimate the applicable credit risky yield curve by calibration that as 
explained earlier is consistent with value additivity. We find that the Duffie and Singleton 
(1999) and Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) models agree as to the size of the spread, the 
difference is always less than two basis points, even for below investment grade bonds. 
 
III Empirical Estimates 
 
Now using the calibrated pure interest volatility, credit spread and hazard rates, and 
initial estimates of the recovery rate, credit correlation and credit volatility, we find the 
default value, the present value of payments from the credit default swap in the event of 




Note that where i >t, h (t,i) and r (t,i) are zero. Equation (8) says that the default value of 
the swap is the present value of expected payoffs in the event of default. The payment is 
[ ] (8)                                 
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determined by the swap contract. In our sample the payment in the event of default is 
defined as face value less the value of the defaulted reference bond B (t,i)d where d is the 
recovery rate. The entire expression is calculated under the risk neutral expectation 
operator E0 since interest rates are stochastic and correlated with factors that influence 
default. The two candidate models differ in how they determine the hazard rates and the 
values received in the event of default. Specifically Duffie and Singleton (1999) model 
recovery amounts as a fraction of the survival contingent value of the reference security 
(RM) whereas Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) model recovery amounts as a fraction of a 
Treasury zero (RT). As noted earlier, since both models are calibrated to the same 
exogenous credit spread, different recovery amounts result in different estimates of the 
hazard probabilities. 
 




Note that where i >t, h (t,i) and r (t,i) are zero. The buyer pays the premium value 
calculated as the swap rate St as quoted in basis points times the notional amount of the 
reference bond M that we set to be 100.  Payments are conditional upon no prior default 
(1-h (t,i)) at any time t and state i. The present value of this stream of conditional 
payments is found by solving backwards using the binomial structure of pure rates of 
interest. Like (8) the entire expression is calculated under the risk neutral expectation 
operator E0 since interest rates are stochastic and correlated with factors that influence 
default. As explained above, Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) 
obtain different hazard rates as they assume different recovery amounts.  
 
Subtracting (9) from (8) will find the economic value of the credit default swap from the 
buyer’s perspective. It is tempting to suggest that a credit default swap should have an 
economic value of zero, that is (8) = (9), when markets are complete and frictionless. In 
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fact, Duffie (1999) finds that this is the case for credit default swaps that insure floating 
rate reference bonds. However, we think there is an additional condition when dealing, as 
we do here, with fixed coupon bonds. Specifically, the correlation between pure rates of 
interest and the hazard rate must be zero.
11  
 
The degree of correlation between the pure rate of interest and the hazard rate is critical 
because it affects the cost of hedging a credit default swap. Consider a hedge portfolio 
consisting of a long position in a Treasury bond Bf and a short position in the reference 
bond Bc that is subject to credit risk. For simplicity, let both bonds be priced at par and be 
of the same maturity. This position is (nearly) equivalent to a selling a credit default swap 
S that insures the reference bond in the event of default. In other words, 
 
 
If the reference bond does not default, then the credit default swap expires worthless and 
Bf and Bc mature at par, so (10) holds. However, if the reference bond defaults, losses on 
the reference bond are recovered from the credit default swap, so the default payoff on Bc 
is still par. Bf however, may be worth more or less than par value at the date of default, 
depending upon what has happened to pure rates of interest, so the cost of hedging the 
swap may cost more (or less) than (10). 
 
If the correlation between pure rates of interest and hazard rates were zero, then the 
relationship between interest rates and default is unsystematic. With large enough 
portfolios, over time losses on the above hedge portfolio will be offset by gains. 
Therefore (10) is a strict equality as the difference between the long Treasury bond Bf 
and the short corporate bond Bc equals the cost of hedging the credit default swap S. This 
also means that the credit default swap premium would equal expected payoffs since 
from (10) the price of the credit default swap equals the expected payoff in the event of 
default. In other words the credit default swap has an economic value of zero since 
payoffs on the swap (8) equals the swap premium (9).  
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If the correlation between pure rates of interest and hazard rates are positive, this means 
that on average the above hedge portfolio will actually experience a loss since default 
will tend to occur in states where interest rates are high and the value of the hedging 
Treasury bond is below par.  This means the cost of hedging is greater than that 
suggested by (10) and the credit default swap has a negative economic value, as payoffs 
(8) are less than the swap premium (9). If the correlation between pure rates of interest 
and hazard rates are negative, this means that on average the above hedge portfolio will 
actually experience a gain since default will tend to occur in states where interest rates 
are low and the value of the hedging Treasury bond is above par.  This means the cost of 
hedging is less than that suggested by (10) and the credit default swap has a positive 
economic value, as payoffs (8) are more than the swap premium (9). 
 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Duffee (1998), Collin-Duffresne, Goldstein and Martin 
(2001) and Papageorgiou and Skinner (2001) all find that Treasury interest rates are 
negatively related to the credit spread, suggesting that pure rates of interest are negatively 
related to hazard rates. This suggests that we should expect positive economic values for 
credit default swaps, even in complete, frictionless markets. 
 
The above analysis assumes complete, frictionless markets. Now consider the likely 
impact of liquidity. Given exogenous estimates of recovery rates, then the structure of 
hazard rates will be determined by the credit spread. We think that the credit spread will 
be “too wide” relative to what they should be in a frictionless market because US 
Treasury bonds are more marketable than the corresponding maturity but more credit 
risky reference bond. Consequently hazard rates would be overestimated because the 
candidate credit risk model will be calibrated to a credit spread that reflects differences in 
liquidity as well as credit risk. This would underestimate the value of payments to the 
seller of the swap in (9) and overestimate the value of the credit default swap payoff to 
the buyer in (8). This suggests that the Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Jarrow and 
Turnbull (1995) models would typically measure positive economic values for credit 
default swaps. 
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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Therefore it is an interesting exercise to see whether the candidate models do in fact find 
zero or positive economic values for market traded credit default swaps. We find the 
values of the thirty-one credit default swaps using the calibrated Treasury and corporate 
yield curves and the pure interest rate volatility curve. We use an estimate of correlation 
between Treasury interest rates and hazard rates of -0.1 and hazard volatility of one tenth 
of pure interest rate volatility. As discussed earlier we use the Altman, Cooke and 
Kishore (1999) average recovery rates as estimates of the recovery fraction in the event 
of default that is consistent with the credit rating of the reference security. Since the RM 
assumption that underlies the Duffie and Singleton (1999) model cannot separately 
identify the recovery rate as a single value (it is survival contingent), we replace w with 
the recovery rate d in (7a) when running the model. As the implied cash value of a 
fraction of a survival contingent zero (RM) is less than the corresponding fraction of a 
Treasury zero (RT), the value of the RM recovery rate should be higher in order for it to 
be comparable to the RT recovery rate. The result of this exercise is reported in Tables 1, 
2 and 3 below. 
 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Table 1 shows that for credit default swaps that evidently did not experience problems 
with the Asian currency crisis, Duffie and Singleton (1999) estimates positive economic 
values from the point of view of those buying credit protection. Table 2 shows that for 
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) most have positive economic values but ten of twenty-three 
credit default swaps have negative economic values. However Table 3 shows that for 
those credit default swaps that evidently did experience problems with the Asian currency 
crisis, both models agree that all credit default swaps have a negative economic value.
12  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Notice that Duffie and Singleton (1999) consistently reports higher premium prices and 
default values than Jarrow and Turnbull (1995). This happens because any given 
recovery fraction used for both models implies lower recovery amounts and lower hazard ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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rates in Duffie and Singleton (1999). This result is consistent with the analysis of 
Delianedis and Lagnado (2002) who agree that the RT assumption typically implies 
higher hazard rates than that implied by the RM assumption. These lower hazard 
probabilities but higher default payoffs in Duffie and Singleton (1999) lead to higher 
default values (8). Similarly the premium value (9) is higher for Duffie and Singleton 
(1999) since by calibration a lower recovery amount implies a lower hazard rate. This 
leads to higher probabilities of premium payments and so to higher premium values in 
(9). 
 
To assure ourselves that these results are not materially affected by our choices for the 
correlation between pure and credit risky interest rates, and for credit risk volatility, we 
recomputed these results for a wide range of possible values for these parameters. We 
find that the premium value (9) and the default value (8) increase very slightly, less than 
one half of a cent, as the hazard rate volatility increases by a factor of ten. Similarly, as 
hazard and Treasury rate correlation varies from -0.1 to –0.5, the default value changes 
only very slightly.  
 
Schönbucher (1999) finds the same results when pricing hypothetical credit default 
swaps. The credit default swap pays off only in the event of default, an unlikely event 
even for bonds rated below investment grade. However the payoff in the event of default 
is relatively large, so the credit default swap has a modest value. The correlation between 
credit risk free and credit risky interest rates and hazard rate volatility has little influence 
in determining the default value of the credit default swap since they can only have an 
impact in the event of default which has a small probability mass. The premium value of 
the credit default swap (9) is similarly insensitive to these two parameters as in essence 
the premium value is a cash security like the reference bond. As we have seen, the 
reference bond is sensitive to the credit spread, and insensitive to the correlation between 
Treasury rates and hazard rates and the hazard volatility. 
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Since we expect to observe positive economic values due to a liquidity bias, then we 
suggest that the consistently negative economic values found in Table 3 are likely due to 
a moral hazard problem. The explanation is as follows. 
 
All swaps in our sample include restructuring as a credit event that triggers payments 
from the default swap. Since the buyer of the credit default swap is often the investor in 
the reference bond insured by the credit default swap, then in essence the insured party 
may also influence payments on the insurance contract. Therefore we have a moral 
hazard problem. For example, if the reference bond were likely to default, then the owner 
of the reference bond may press for an early restructuring, prior to the necessity to do so 
because of actual default. An early restructuring is desirable from their perspective since 
delays in restructuring may result in more sever defaults later as the issuer may delay in 
facing up to their problems. The owner of the reference bond could tempt the issuer to 
restructure early by say offering to accept a replacement security with a lower coupon in 
place of the high coupon reference security. Since the owner of the reference bond is 
insured by the credit default swap, losses incurred by the restructuring are offset by 
payments on the credit default swap. Overall at least one, possibly both the issuer and 
owner of the reference security gain but neither would suffer losses. Instead, the seller of 
credit protection incurs loses by paying the difference between the value of the reference 
bond and the replacement bond.  
 
The seller of credit protection now faces an asymmetric information problem. Some 
buyers of credit protection may know more about the possibility of restructuring than the 
seller of credit protection. These knowledgeable buyers of credit protection would buy 
credit default swaps that include restructuring as a credit event if the swap premium 
under prices the likelihood of restructuring. Therefore the seller of credit protection is 
encouraged to require higher credit default swap prices. 
 
 All candidate credit default swap models may be incapable of picking up this larger 
premium, as it would be included in the premium value (9) but maybe not in the default 
value (8). The latter is a possibility since some, but not necessarily all the investors in the ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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reference bond own the credit default swap written on this bond. Furthermore some 
investors will not even know that other investors have bought credit protection since 
credit default swaps trade over the counter. Therefore the likelihood of restructuring due 
to the moral hazard problem may not be included in the price of the reference bond and 
consequently may not be included in the credit spread. Since all candidate credit risk 
models are fine-tuned to agree with the credit spread the credit risk model may not 
include the impact of the moral hazard problem and so (8) may underestimate the 
likelihood of restructuring.  This would lead to negative economic values since (9) 
includes the extra swap premium in S, but (8) and (9) may underestimate the hazard 
probability. 
 
In the absence of the Asian currency crisis, we generally observe the anticipated positive 
economic values for credit default swaps. However where the possibility of restructuring 
is more likely, namely for the below investment grade reference bonds subject to the 
Asian currency crisis, we consistently observe negative rather than positive economic 
values for the corresponding credit default swaps. This means that compensation for 
bearing credit risk as measured in (9) is more than the anticipated cost of credit risk as 
measured in (8) even though the hazard rate is probably overestimated due to a liquidity 
bias. We suggest that this occurred because the moral hazard problem was so sever in the 
case of reference bonds subject to the Asian currency crisis that sellers of credit 
protection demanded (and received) a visible “restructuring risk premium” due to the 
moral hazard problem. 
 
IV Summary and Conclusions 
 
We examine the empirical performance of the Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Jarrow 
and Turnbull (1995) models on a sample of thirty-one credit default swaps that traded 
during 1997 to 1999. We find that, consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
Delianedis and Lagnado (2002), the RM assumption that underlies Duffie and Singleton 
(1999) returns higher premium and default values for credit default swaps than the RT 
assumption that underlies Jarrow and Turnbull (1995). We are able to estimate these ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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models, as we are able to generate a credit risky yield curve that is applicable to the 
underlying reference bond. We are able to estimate this yield curve by calibration by 
appealing to basic financial theory.  
 
We generally find positive economic values (from the buyers perspective) for non-Asian 
credit default swaps, which is what we expect given that credit spreads reflect liquidity as 
well as credit risk. However, both models consistently find negative economic values for 
Asian credit default swaps.  We suggest this happens because of a moral hazard problem. 
Sellers of Asian credit default swaps suspected that some buyers were also investors in 
the reference bond. Sellers then believed that some buyers could control the conditions of 
payoff from the credit default swap.  Faced with information asymmetry, being unable to 
distinguish between those buyers that have accurate information concerning the 
likelihood of restructuring and those that do not, the sellers of credit protection 
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Non-Asian Swaps-Duffie and Singleton (1999) 
 
This table reports the economic values for non-Asian swaps that traded from March 
31, 1998 until February 22, 1999. These values are found using the historical recovery 
rate of 60% for A rated, 50% for BBB rated and 37% for B rated bonds.  











$ per 100) 
Difference 






31/03/98  119  108  6.89  4.47  2.42  99  BBB 
06/05/98  117  60  4.38  2.16  2.22  104  BBB 
28/05/98  117  108  7.17  4.11  3.06  88  BBB 
03/06/98  116  57  3.77  2.00  1.77  94  BBB 
16/06/98  47  47  2.57  2.33  0.24  76  A 
30/07/98  115  115  6.98  2.81  4.17  97  BBB 
06/08/98  78  60  21.87  18.26  3.61  504  B 
21/08/98  114  60  3.84  2.28  1.56  92  BBB 
01/09/98  114  114  11.51  5.28  6.24  156  BBB 
02/09/98  114  60  5.98  3.31  2.66  140  BBB 
02/09/98  114  114  10.36  5.66  4.70  140  BBB 
07/09/98  113  60  5.12  3.08  2.04  122  BBB 
08/09/98  113  60  5.38  3.00  2.38  131  BBB 
15/09/98  113  60  5.66  3.46  2.21  136  BBB 
24/09/98  113  113  9.23  7.12  2.11  126  BBB 
11/11/98  111  84  6.89  4.75  2.14  122  BBB 
17/11/98  111  60  4.74  3.05  1.70  114  BBB 
20/11/98  111  60  4.36  2.93  1.43  103  BBB 
24/11/98  111  111  8.15  5.00  3.15  115  BBB 
16/12/98  110  84  6.44  3.47  2.97  115  BBB 
04/02/99  108  108  5.18  3.10  2.08  75  BBB 
22/02/99  108  108  8.91  3.05  5.85  76  BBB 
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Table 2 
Non-Asian Swaps-Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) 
 
This table reports the economic values for non-Asian swaps that traded from March 
31, 1998 until February 22, 1999. These values are found using the historical recovery 
rate of 60% for A rated, 50% for BBB rated and 37% for B rated bonds.  











$ per 100) 
Difference 






31/03/98  119  108  3.86  4.27  -0.41  100  BBB 
06/05/98  117  60  2.27  2.09  0.18  106  BBB 
28/05/98  117  108  3.99  3.93  0.06  90  BBB 
03/06/98  116  57  2.51  1.95  0.57  95  BBB 
16/06/98  47  47  Fail  Fail  Fail  77  A 
30/07/98  115  115  3.90  2.68  1.22  98  BBB 
06/08/98  78  60  15.77  16.00  -0.23  505  B 
21/08/98  114  60  2.19  2.22  -0.03  93  BBB 
01/09/98  114  114  6.56  4.90  1.66  157  BBB 
02/09/98  114  60  3.42  3.19  0.24  141  BBB 
02/09/98  114  114  5.86  5.29  0.57  141  BBB 
07/09/98  113  60  2.92  2.97  -0.05  123  BBB 
08/09/98  113  60  3.12  2.89  0.23  132  BBB 
15/09/98  113  60  3.24  3.33  -0.09  137  BBB 
24/09/98  113  113  5.19  6.71  -1.52  127  BBB 
11/11/98  111  84  3.88  4.54  -0.65  123  BBB 
17/11/98  111  60  2.70  2.95  -0.25  115  BBB 
20/11/98  111  60  2.43  2.85  -0.42  104  BBB 
24/11/98  111  111  4.57  4.74  -0.17  116  BBB 
16/12/98  110  84  3.62  3.32  0.30  116  BBB 
04/02/99  108  108  4.32  2.99  1.33  76  BBB 
22/02/99  108  108  4.96  2.90  2.05  77  BBB 






















 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 





This table reports the economic values for Asian swaps that traded from Sept 8, 1997 
until July 17, 1998. These values are found using a 60% and 39% recovery rate for 
AA and BB rated reference bonds respectively. In the first column, DS = Duffie and 
Singleton (1999) and JT = Jarrow and Turnbull (1995). 







Value (in $ 
per 100) 
Premium 
Value (in $ 
per 100) 
Difference 







DS  08/09/97  61  60  4.25  2.99  1.27  98  AA 
JT  08/09/97  61  60  Fail  Fail  Fail  99  AA 
DS  09/06/98  54  54  17.56  21.66  -4.09  432  BB 
JT  09/06/98  54  54  12.06  19.52  -7.47  433  BB 
DS  30/06/98  53  53  18.13  22.29  -4.16  453  BB 
JT  30/06/98  53  53  12.69  20.00  -7.31  454  BB 
DS  30/06/98  53  53  18.13  20.89  -2.76  453  BB 
JT  30/06/98  53  53  12.69  18.80  -6.11  454  BB 
DS  13/07/98  39  12  4.97  6.55  -1.58  532  BB 
JT  13/07/98  39  12  4.09  6.30  -2.21  533  BB 
DS  14/07/98  52  12  3.92  6.04  -2.13  415  BB 
JT  14/07/98  52  12  3.21  5.82  -2.62  416  BB 
DS  15/07/98  52  12  3.96  5.99  -2.03  419  BB 
JT  15/07/98  52  12  3.24  5.81  -2.57  420  BB 
DS  17/07/98  52  12  3.96  6.04  -2.08  419  BB 
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1 For a discussion of the moral hazard problem from the practitioner’s perspective, see Bennett (2000), 
Risk, Vol.14, no. 3 (March 2001), pages S6-S7, also Cass (2000), same issue S16-S18. 
2 Sometimes it is suggested that we use the balance sheet identity and value the firm’s assets as the 
value of the equity and liabilities since equity and many liabilities trade. Unfortunately, a large portion 
of a firm’s liabilities does not trade as well, so this approach is not a solution. 
3 Harrison and Kreps (1979) show that equivalent martingale (risk neutral probability) measures exist 
in the absence of arbitrage. These measures are unique if markets are complete. 
4 Scaling the covariance between two variables by the variance of the independent variable is very 
common in finance. Some examples are OLS hedge ratios and the CAPM model. 
5 Details of how to implement Black Derman and Toy (1990) can be found in Clewlow and Strickland 
(1998), chapter 8. 
6 Since we include correlation between credit risky and Treasury interest rates, (5) represents a minor 
extension to Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) who assume zero correlation between these two parameters. 
7 Alternatively we can roll forwards through the corporate state price tree by multiplying expected 
values under hazard probabilities by pure interest state security prices. The same comment applies to 
binomial version of Duffie and Singleton (1999). 
8 Duffie and Singleton (1999) also propose a “return of face value” (RF) recovery assumption. In this 
case the fractional loss Lt is simply a fraction of next periods promised amount or (1-wtVt+1). They 
demonstrate that there is little difference between the results obtained whether we use the RF or RM 
recovery assumption, a result that we also find here. Therefore for the sake of brevity we omit mention 
of this in the main text. 
9 A bond may “fail to pay” and yet not cause bankruptcy because a bond may miss a coupon payment 
and pay later without any bankruptcy event. In the event of a missed coupon payment on the underlying 
bond, the credit default swap will payoff. 
10 It is tempting to suggest that the credit default swap premium should not be larger than the credit 
spread since this would suggest that insuring the bond against default is more costly than compensation 
granted in the bond market for credit risk. This view is erroneous since it assumes that the maturity of 
the credit default swap is the same as the underlying bond. For Asian swaps, this is not case. In fact, 
most Asian swaps have a shorter maturity that the underling reference bond so the high swap premiums 
may well mean that credit risk is extraordinarily high in the short term that is averaged in bond market 
yield quotes. 
11 This also assumes that the credit default swap contract is not vulnerable. Specifically, the writer and 
buyer of credit protection are not subject to credit risk.  A weaker condition is that the writer and buyer 
are equally vulnerable. 
12 Figure 2 shows that the very first Asian credit default swap’s premium was not extraordinarily high. 
Furthermore the credit rating reported in Table 2 is investment grade and the date of trade was 
September 8, 1997, prior to the Asian currency crisis. We conclude that the first Asian credit default 
swap was not subject to the Asian currency crisis. Also note that Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) failed to 
converge using historical AA recovery rates as the model did earlier in attempting to price the non-
Asian swap of 16/06/98. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: DP2003-04 
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